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Stability and optimality of multi-scale transportation networks with
distributed dynamic tolls
Rosario Maggistro1 and Giacomo Como1,2
Abstract— We study transportation networks controlled by
dynamical feedback tolls. We consider a multiscale transporta-
tion network model whereby the dynamics of the traffic flows
are intertwined with those of the drivers’ route choices. The
latter are influenced by the congestion status on the whole
network as well as dynamic tolls set by the system operator.
Our main result shows that a broad class of decentralized
congestion-dependent tolls globally stabilise the transportation
network around a Wardrop equilibrium. Moreover, using
dynamic marginal cost tolls, stability of the transportation
network can be guaranteed around the social optimum traffic
assignment. This is particularly remarkable as the considered
decentralized feedback toll policies do not require any global
information about the network structure or the exogenous
traffic load on the network or state and can be computed in
a fully local way. We also evaluate the performance of these
feedback toll policies both in the asymptotic and during the
transient regime, through numerical simulations.
Index Terms— Transportation networks; traffic control; dy-
namic pricing; social-optimum traffic assignment; Wardrop
equilibrium; marginal cost pricing; dynamical flow networks;
robust distributed control.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years. controlling the roadway congestion has
become one of the main target of the transportation research
community. Proposed strategies include imposing constraints
on traffic flow through mechanisms such as variable speed
limits, ramp metering, or traffic signal control (see [1]–[4]
and references therein). However, such mechanisms do not
consider neither the drivers’ perspective nor affect the total
amount of vehicles. There has been also a significant research
effort to understand the drivers’ answer to external com-
munications from intelligent traveller information devices
(see, e.g., [5]–[6]) and, in particular, studying the effect of
such technologies on the drivers’ route choice behaviour and
on the dynamical properties of the transportation network
[7]. A traffic recommender which can announce potentially
misleading travel time information and a new class of
latency functions so as to influence the drivers’ behaviour
was studied in [8] and [9], respectively. Moreover, it is
known that if individual drivers make their own routing
decisions to minimize their own experienced delays, overall
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network congestion can be considerably higher than if a
central planner had the ability to explicitly direct traffic.
Accordingly, to charge tolls for the purpose of influencing
drivers to make routing choices that result in globally optimal
routing was a central research focus (see [10]–[15]).
In this paper, we extend the model and results of [7] by
introducing decentralized congestion-dependent tolls in order
to influence the driver’s route choice behaviour. Specifically,
we consider a multiscale dynamical model of the transporta-
tion network whereby the traffic dynamics describing the real
time evolution of the local congestion level are coupled with
those of the drivers’ path preferences. We assume that the
latter evolve following a perturbed best response to global
information about the congestion status of the whole network
and to decentralized flow-dependent tolls.
Our main result shows that by using non-decreasing de-
centralized flow-dependent tolls and in the limit of a small
update rate of the aggregate path preferences, the trans-
portation network globally stabilises around the Wardrop
equilibrium [16]. As in [7], we assume that the drivers’ path
preferences evolve at a slower time scale than the physical
traffic flows and adopt a singular perturbation approach [17]
to the stability analysis of the ensuing multiscale closed-loop
traffic dynamics. Note that classic results of evolutionary
game theory and population dynamics [18]–[19] cannot be
applied to our framework since they suppose that the access
to information take place at a single temporal and spatial
scale and that the traffic dynamics are neglected by assuming
that they are instantaneously equilibrated.
The introduction of tolls has long been studied as a way
to influence the rational and selfish behaviour of drivers
so that the associated Wardrop equilibrium can align with
the system optimum network flow. A well-studied taxation
mechanism that guarantees this alignment is marginal-cost
pricing (see, e.g., [20] and [21]). Marginal-cost tolls do not
require any global information about the network structure,
user demands or state and can be computed in a fully
local way. Using marginal-cost tolls we prove that our
transportation network stabilizes around the social optimum
traffic assignment. It is worth observing that our results go
well beyond the traditional setting [20] where only static
frameworks are considered as well as [21] where only path
preference dynamics are consider, neglecting the physical
ones that are assumed equilibrated. In fact, our analysis is
carried over in a fully dynamical flow network setting. In this
respect, the global optimality guarantees that are obtained in
this paper through decentralized feedback toll policies should
be compared with other recent results on global performance
and resilience results on robust distributed control of dynam-
ical flow networks [22]–[26].
In the last part of the paper through numerical simulations
we compare the performance both asymptotic and during the
transient of the system by using distributed marginal cost
tolls and constant marginal cost ones. The latter, know in
the literature as “fixed” tolls (being the tolling function on
each edge a constant function of edge flow) have been well
studied, and it is known that they can be computed to enforce
the social optimum equilibrium provided that the system
planner has a complete knowledge of the network topology,
user demand profile and delay functions. We show that not
only is more convenient take into account the marginal cost
tolls at convergence speed level but also they are strongly
robust to variation of network topology, user demand and
traffic rate (see [27] and [28]).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we describe the model and observe the influence
of distributed dynamics tolls on the network dynamics.
In Section III we state the main results of the paper. In
Section IV we provide a numerical study of the different
time and asymptotic convergences of the system. Section V
draws conclusions and suggests future works. Due to space
limitations, we do not include any proofs of our results here
and refer the reader to a forthcoming journal publication [29].
A. Notation
Let R and R+ := {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0} be the set of real and
nonnegative real numbers, respectively. Let A and B be finite
sets. Then |A| denotes the cardinality of A, RA the space
of real-valued vectors whose components are indexed by
elements of A, and RA×B the space of real-valued matrices
whose entries are indexed by pairs in A×B. The transpose
of a matrix Q ∈ RA×B is denoted by Q′ ∈ RB×A, I is an
identity matrix and 1 an all one vector whose size depends on
the context. We use the notation Φ := I−|A|−111′ ∈ RA×A
to denote the projection matrix of the space orthogonal to 1.
The simplex of a probability vector over A is denoted by
S(A) = {x ∈ RA+ : 1′x = 1}. Let ‖ · ‖p be the class of
p-norms for p ∈ [1,∞], and by default, let ‖ ·‖ := ‖ ·‖2. Let
now sgn : R → {−1, 0, 1} be the sign function, defined
by sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0, sgn(x) = −1 if x < 0 and
sgn(x) = 0 if x = 0. By convention, we will assume the
identity d|x|/dx = sgn(x) to be valid for every x ∈ R,
including x = 0. Finally, given the gradient ∇f of a function
f : D → R with D ⊆ RA, we denote with ∇˜f = Φ∇f the
projected gradient on S(A).
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Network characteristics
We describe the topology of the transportation network
by a directed multi-graph G = (V, E), where V is a finite set
of nodes and E is the set of links e, each directed from its
tail node θe to its head node κe 6= θe. We shall allow for
parallel links, i.e. θe = θj and κe = κj with e 6= j, but
not for self loops, i.e., we shall assume that θe 6= κe for
every e ∈ E . We shall denote by B ∈ {−1, 0, 1}V×E the
node-link incidence matrix of G, whose entries are defined
as Bie = 1 if i = θe, Bie = −1 if i = κe, and Bie = 0
otherwise. For two nodes o 6= d in V , an o-d path is a length-
` string of links p = (e1, e2, . . . , e`) such that θes+1 = κes
for s = 1, . . . , ` − 1, θe1 = o, κe` = d, and no node is
touched twice, i.e., ir 6= is for all 0 ≤ r < s ≤ `. The
set of o − d paths in G of any length ` will be denoted by
P . Moreover, we shall denote the corresponding link-path
incidence matrix by A ∈ {0, 1}E×P with entries
Aep =
{
1 if e is along p
0 otherwise
and assume that each link e ∈ E lies on at least one path
from node o to node d. A path of length greater than or equal
to 2 from a node to itself is referred to as a cycle. Observe
that, in contrast to [7] where the transportation network was
assumed acyclic, we allow for the presence of cycles in the
network topology G. For every link e ∈ E and time instant
t ≥ 0 we denote the current traffic density and flow by xe(t)
and fe(t) respectively, and assume the following functional
dependence
fe = µe(xe), e ∈ E , (1)
such that µe : R+ → R+ is continuously differen-
tiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and µe(0) =
0, µ′e(0) <∞. Note that in classical transportation theory
the flow-density function are typically not strictly increasing,
but here our assumption is valid as long as we confine
ourselves to the free-flow region, as is done in [7]. Then,
for every link e ∈ E , let Ce := sup{µe(xe) : xe ≥ 0} be its
maximum flow capacity and let F := ∏e∈E [0, Ce) be the
set of feasible flow vectors. We shall use the delay functions
T : RE+ → [0,+∞]E ,
Te(fe) :=

+∞ if fe ≥ Ce,
µ−1e (fe)
fe
if fe ∈ (0, Ce),
1
µ′e(0)
if fe = 0
(2)
returning the delay incurred by drivers traversing link e ∈
E , when the current flow out of it is fe. Note that, by the
properties of µe, Te(fe) is continuous, strictly increasing,
and such that Te(0) > 0.
B. Paths choice and traffic dynamics
We assume that the physical traffic flow consist of in-
distinguishable homogeneous drivers which enter in the
network through the origin node, travel through it using the
different paths and finally exit from the network through the
destination node. The relative appeal of the different paths to
the drivers is modelled by a time-varying probability vector
over P , which will be referred as the current aggregate path
preference and denoted by z(t). Assuming a constant unit
in-flow in the origin node, we consider the vector
fz := Az
of the flows associated to the path preference z(t) and define
Z := {z ∈ S(P) : fze < Ce ∀e ∈ E}
the set of feasible path preference. The vector z(t) is up-
dated as drivers access global information about the current
congestion status of the whole network (that is embodied
by the flow vector f(t)) and is influenced by a vector of
decentralized congestion-dependent tolls
w : RE+ → [0,+∞]E , we(fe) ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E , (3)
that are charged to users traversing link e. In particular,
we shall assume that the tolls we are continuous and non-
decreasing functions of the current flow for every link e ∈ E .
We shall assume that the cost perceived by each user
crossing a link e ∈ E is given by the sum of the the
delay Te(fe) and the toll we(fe). Moreover, as in [7], we
shall assume that path preferences are updated at some rate
η > 0 which is small with respect to the time scale of
the network flow dynamics. Then, from f(t), the drivers
evaluate the vector A′(T (f(t)) +w(f(t))), whose pth entry,∑
eAep(Te(fe(t))+we(fe(t))), coincides with the perceived
total cost that a driver expects to incur on path p assuming
that the congestion levels on that path won’t change during
the journey. Hence, according to some feasible path prefer-
ence Fh(f(t)) ∈ Z, z(t) evolves as
z˙(t) = η(Fh(f(t))− z(t)), (4)
where Fh : F → Z is a perturbed best response function,
Fh(f) := arg min
α∈Zh
{α′A′(T (f) + w(f)) + h(α)}, f ∈ F ,
(5)
and h : Zh → R is an admissible perturbation such
that Zh ⊆ Z is a closed convex set, h(·) is strictly
convex, twice differentiable in int(Zh), and is such that
limz→∂Zh‖∇˜h(z)‖ = ∞. The definition of Fh and the
conditions on h imply that Fh(f) ∈ int(Zh) and that Fh(f)
is differentiable on F .
We now describe the local route decisions, characterizing
the fraction of drivers choosing each outgoing link when
traversing a nondestination node. Such a fraction is the
function Ge(z) defined as
Ge(z) =

fze∑
j∈E:θj=θe
fzj
if fze > 0,
1
|{j ∈ E : θj = θe}| if
∑
j∈E:θj=θe
fzj = 0,
(6)
for every e ∈ E . Note that ∑kGk(z) = 1, where k are the
outgoing links from the same node.
We refer to G : Z → RE as the local decision function that
is continuously differentiable on Z.
Now, for every e ∈ E conservation of mass implies that
x˙e(t) = He(f(t), z(t)), (7)
where for all z ∈ Z and f ∈ F ,
He(f, z) := Ge(z)
(
δ
(o)
θe
+
∑
j:κj=θe
fj
)
− fe. (8)
We now consider the evolution of the coupled dynamics{
z˙(t) = η(Fh(f(t))− z(t)),
x˙(t) = H(f(t), z(t))
(9)
where Fh is defined in (5), η > 0 is the rate at which z(t)
is updated and H(f, z) = {He(f, z) : e ∈ E}.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we give the main results of the paper. We
shall prove that for small η and h, the long-time behaviour
of the system (9) is approximately at Wardrop equilibrium
[16] which, under proper distributed dynamic tolls, coincides
with the social optimum equilibrium.
Definition 1: (Social optimum equilibrium). A feasible
flow vector f∗ ∈ F is a Social optimum equilibrium if and
only if is the unique solution of the following network flow
optimization problem
f∗ = arg min
f≥0
Bf=(δ(o)−δ(d))
∑
e∈E
feTe(fe). (10)
Definition 2: (Wardrop equilibrium). For a given vector
w ∈ RE+ of decentralized link tolls, a feasible flow vector
f (w) ∈ F is a Wardrop equilibrium if f (w) = fz for some
z ∈ Z such that for all p ∈ P ,
zp > 0 =⇒ (A
′ (T (fz) + w(fz)))p ≤
(A′ (T (fz) + w(fz)))q ∀q ∈ P.
(11)
Existence and uniqueness of a Wardrop equilibrium are
guaranteed considering the direct multi-graph G and under
the assumption on µe and we. (See Theorem 2.4 and 2.5 in
[30] for a complete proof).
Theorem 3: Let G be the direct multi-graph, µ be as
in (1) and w as in (3). Then for every initial condition
(z(0), x(0)) ∈ Z × [0,+∞)E there exists a unique solution
of (9). Moreover, there exists a perturbed equilibrium flow
f (h) ∈ F such that for all η > 0
lim sup
t→∞
‖f(t)− f (h)‖ ≤ δ(η), (12)
where δ(η) is a non negative real-valued, nondecreasing
function such that limη→0 δ(η) = 0. Moreover, for ev-
ery sequence of admissible perturbations {hk} such that
limk‖hk‖ = 0 and limk Zhk = Z 1, one has
lim
k→∞
f (hk) = f (w). (13)
Theorem 3 states that the system planner globally stabilises
the transportation network around the Wardrop equilibrium
using increasing decentralised congestion-dependent tolls.
Remark 4: Note that Theorem 3 is not a Corollary of
Theorem 2.5 in [7], because, although the functions T and
1The convergence limk Zhk = Z holds with respect to the Hausdorff
metric and Z is the closure of Z.
w both depend on the flow f , it is not possible consider an
auxiliary function T = T+w and directly applying the result
from [7] due to the specific structure imposed on T in (2).
Now, we choose as decentralized tolls the marginal cost
ones, namely,
we(fe) = feT
′
e(fe) ∀e ∈ E . (14)
Due the properties of the delay function Te(fe), the above
tolls (14) are increasing, then the Theorem 3 continue to
hold. Moreover the following holds
Corollary 5: Considering (14) one gets that the system
(9) globally stabilises the transportation network around the
social optimum traffic assignment f∗ without knowing arrival
rates or the network structure.
In order to prove the above we observe that considering
proper costs on the links, the vector f (w) is the solution
of a network flow optimization problem. Let
De(fe) :=
∫ fe
0
(
Te(s) + sT
′
e(s)
)
ds e ∈ E ,
be the integral of the perceived cost on link e using (14).
Then, the network flow f (w) ∈ RE+ is a Wardrop equilibrium
if and only if is the unique solution of the network flow
optimization problem
f (w) = arg min
f≥0
Bf=(δ(o)−δ(d))
∑
e∈E
De(fe), (15)
where Bf = (δ(o) − δ(d)) is the mass conservation law.
Moreover, the Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the sys-
tem optimum flow,
f (w) = f∗. (16)
The proof of such result is very simple and use the Lagrange
techniques.
Remark 6: The tolls (14) differ by the well now decentral-
ized constant marginal cost tolls w∗e = f
∗
e T
′
e(f
∗
e ) ∀e ∈ E ,
since the latter, in order to be used, require the knowledge
of both of the social optimum flow and the inflow vector.
Anyway taking into account such w∗e , condition (16) continue
to hold.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC AND TRANSIENT PERFORMANCES
In this section, through numerical simulations we will
compare the different performances both asymptotic and
during the transient given by using the marginal cost tolls
(14) and the constant marginal cost ones (see the Remark
6). We performed several experiments with different graph
topologies for η ranging from 0.1 to 50. In all these cases
we found that the use of the decentralized marginal cost tolls
is more convenient than the constant marginal ones. Indeed:
− concerning the transient convergence, one shows that the
time needed to reach the perturbed equilibrium associated
to the marginal cost tolls is lower than the one to reach the
equilibrium associated to the constant marginal ones;
− when the admissible perturbation goes to zero, the per-
turbed equilibrium associated to marginal cost tolls, asymp-
totically converges to the social optimum flow faster than the
one associated to the constant marginal cost ones.
We demonstrate these findings through the following exam-
ple. The parameters were selected as follows:
• graph topology G as in Fig. 1;
• the flow-density function is
µe(xe) = 2(1− e−xe) ∀e ∈ E ,
and the corresponding delay function, according to (2)
is given by
Te(fe) =

+∞ if fe ≥ 2,
1
fe
log
(
2
2− fe
)
if fe ∈ (0, 2),
1/2 if fe = 0.
(17)
• Fh as the logit function
Fhp (f) =
exp(−β(A′(T (f) + w(f)))p)∑
q∈P exp(−β(A′(T (f) + w(f)))q)
, p ∈ P,
(18)
with β > 0 the fixed noise parameter.
• η = 0.1, G as in (6),
• initial conditions: zp1(0) = 1/2, zp2(0) = 1/6,
zp3(0) = 1/3, xe1(0) = 4, xe2(0) = 2, xe3(0) = 3,
xe4(0) = 1, xe5(0) = 5.
By the implementations follows that for t ∈ [0, 350] and β =
1, the first time in which the system reaches the equilibrium
associated to (14) is t = 2.17 · 102, while it is t = 2.5 · 102
the one to approach the equilibrium relative to w∗e .
The 1-norm distance of fβ (that is the perturbed equilibrium
flow corresponding to the system (9) using (18)) computed
at final time T = 350, from the social optimum flow f∗ for
β ranging from 1 to 12 is plotted in Fig. 2. This is done
both considering (14) and w∗e . Note that the parameter β
o
a
b
d
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
1 1
Fig. 1. The graph topology used for the simulations.
should takes very large values in order to completely vanish
the norm of the difference between fβ and f∗; but, in our
numerical example, we can see in Fig. 2 that already for β =
12 the previous norm is almost null and also the asymptotic
convergence of fβ associated to (14) is slightly faster than
the one of fβ associated to w∗e .
A. Robustness
To investigate the robustness of the marginal cost tolls
to variations of network’s parameters, a system planner can
2 4 6 8 10 12
beta
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
|| f
-
f*||
1
constant marginal tolls
marginal tolls
11 11.5 12
4
5
6
10-3
Fig. 2. Plot of ‖fβ(T )− f∗‖1 for decentralised marginal and constant
marginal tolls .
study the effect of the variation on the total latency computed
in f (w), where the total latency is defined as
L(f) =
∑
e∈E
feTe(fe).
By corollary 5 follows that the efficiency guarantees provided
by the marginal cost tolls are robust to variation in network
and demand structure. Indeed the following hold:
Proposition 7: (See [20]) For homogeneous populations,
the marginal cost tolls (14) incentives optimal flows on all
networks, i.e.,
L(f (w)) = L(f∗). (19)
Hence, the marginal cost tolls are strongly robust to varia-
tions of network topology, user demand structure and overall
traffic rate. In the following we will show (see Fig. 3), still
using the graph topology in Fig. 1 and its parameters, that
lim
β→+∞
L(fβ) = L(f∗)
and the asymptotic convergence using fβ associated to (14)
is lightly faster than the one in which using fβ associated
to w∗e .
2 4 6 8 10 12
beta
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
L(f
)-L
(f*
)
constant marginal tolls
marginal tolls
11 11.5 12
7
8
9
10
10-4
Fig. 3. Plot of the difference L(fβ(T ))− L(f∗) as β increases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied stability of Wardrop equilibria of
multi-scale transportation networks with distributed dynamic
tolls. We prove that if the frequency of updates of path
preferences is sufficiently small and considering positive,
non-decreasing decentralized flow-dependent tolls, then the
state of the network ultimately approaches a neighborhood
of the Wardrop equilibrium. Then, using a particular class of
tolls, i.e., the marginal cost ones, we observe that the stability
is around the social optimum equilibrium and, thanks to
numerical experiments, the performances both asymptotic
and during the transient of the system is better than the one
obtained considering the constant marginal tolls. In future
research, inspired by the numerical results we will provide
analytic estimates about the different convergence rates. We
also plan to define a more general class of tolls that does not
require the knowledge of the delay functions and at the same
time guarantees the convergence to the social optimum.
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